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Instruments of Government: Perceptions and 
Contexts 
STE PH EN H. LI N DE R, Public Health, University of Texas, Houston 
B. GUY PETERS, Political Science, University of Pittsburgh 
ABSTRACT 
Government uses a wide variety of instruments to reach its policy goals, 
ranging from indirect methods, such as moral suasion and cash induce- 
ments, to more direct ones involving government provision of services. 
Although there has been a fair amount of writing on the nature and use of 
various policy instruments, there is very little work on either the meaning 
ascribed to these instruments by the decisionmakers who use them (or the 
experts who design them) or the processes by which some come to be 
favored over others. Characteristics of the political system, such as 
national policy style, the organizational setting of the decisionmaker, and 
the problem situation are all likely to have some influence over the choice 
of instruments. The relative impact of these variables, however, is likely to 
be mediated by subjective factors linked to cognition. Perceptions of the 
proper 'tool to do the job' intervenes between context and choice in a 
complex way. Efforts to account for variation in instrument choice, then, 
must focus not only on macro level variables but on micro ones as well. 
Governments have a number of tools at their disposal for exercising their 
influence over the economy and society. These tools range from simple 
exhortations to complex tax and benefit schemes. As often as these tools 
are used by government, however, they are not well understood. The 
inadequacy of our knowledge is especially noticeable when it comes to the 
political meaning of various tools and the process by which government 
officials choose among them. An instrument's meaning and appeal to 
decisionmakers can ultimately be traced to individual perceptions and the 
subjective values that reinforce them. How decisionmakers and their 
policy advisors perceive the instruments of government policy conditions 
their views of problem situations, biases their expectations of perform- 
ance, and shapes their choices. Further, these perceptions operate within 
a complex ecology of contexts, beginning with the decisionmaker's 
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immediate organizational circumstances and extending to features of 
their political system. Understanding instrument meaning and choice, 
then, will take us beyond cognitive variables to consider their interaction 
with organizational and systemic factors. 
Although inquiry into policy instruments is not new, the approach 
taken here differs from most other work on this topic in its commitment to 
a subjectivist interpretation and to bridging different levels of analysis. It 
is relatively unconcerned with normative evaluation of instruments 
(Tinbergen, I956; Kirschen, I964), or even with attempting to provide a 
thorough description of their characteristics (Kettl, I987; McDonnell and 
Elmore, I986; Hood, 1984). Rather, our interest is concentrated on how 
instruments are viewed by actors inside and outside government who 
make choices about them and, more specifically, in the criteria used by 
those actors to judge the suitability of instruments for addressing policy 
problems. The importance of the user's viewpoint is hinted at in the 
literatures on the tools of government and on policy design, but it has not 
yet been addressed systematically. Instead, objective criteria underlying 
instrument choice have been either inferred from general patterns of use 
(Salamon, I 98 I) or attributed to decisionmakers based on functional 
policy definitions (Phidd and Doern, 1978). 
Our ultimate aim is to develop a multi-level theory of policy design that 
will both account for micro patterns of instrument choice and contribute 
to a better understanding of the macro features of the policy design 
process. Accordingly, our analysis begins with the cognitive factors that 
shape instrument choice and appraisal and then attempts to place those 
subjective factors into their proper institutional and systemic context. At 
the level of the decisionmaker, cognitive factors effectively mediate all 
performance information and determine which, if any, technical informa- 
tion on policy design become a part of the calculus of instrument choice. 
The factors salient to design and choice then are likely to vary not only 
with the background and roles of experts and decisionmakers but more 
importantly with their cognitive orientations and certain features of their 
context. 
From this subjectivist perspective, the empirical record of the successes 
and failures of a given instrument across problem situations becomes far 
less important than decisionmakers' perceptions of that performance. 
Viewing performance through the eyes of the decisionmaker, and perhaps 
the eyes of the designer as well, is more tractable empirically than 
collecting and classifying extensive case materials across numerous policy 
domains. More importantly, it promises greater validity since so much of 
what constitutes the reality of policy is socially and politically defined and 
can easily confound the objective categories imposed by an outside 
investigator. Starting from a cognitive foundation, we are better able to 
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piece together how the available theory about instruments, technical and 
anecdotal information on their performance, and contextual factors 
influence judgments about instruments without relying solely on logical 
reconstructions of policy types or observed patterns of instrument 
adoption. 
Although it would appear that much of the selection of policy instru- 
ments is done through familiarity, political tradition, or professional bias, 
it is still extremely important to know what decisionmakers believe they 
are getting when they choose one instrument rather than another. This 
can be accomplished simply by asking decisionmakers to position instru- 
ments with respect to each other; alternatively, one can request that 
instruments be rated on a number of explicit criteria. In the former 
instance, criteria are discovered inferentially, while in the latter, they are 
supplied by the investigator as explicit hypotheses. Neither approach is 
superior, although the inferential strategy is typically ignored in favor of 
the more familiar terrain of the rating scale. The open-ended questions 
common to most elite interviews (Putnam, I 978), moreover, are too blunt 
a device to reveal underlying perceptual structures. Yet, using rating 
scales alone elevates the risk of false positives, in effect, discovering 
criteria of dubious relevance. Accurately mapping the decisionmaker's 
perception of instruments will require more careful attention to measure- 
ment issues than in the past, and a more complex measurement strategy. 
To link perception with choice, however, we must turn to context. 
Several distinct notions of context are important here: one encompasses 
the institutional setting within which the decisionmaker operates; another 
is synonymous with the problem situation that creates the occasion for 
instrument choice; and yet another is a convenient summary of the 
temporality and other unique circumstances of the choice. In the first 
sense of context, we expect the organizational, institutional, and systemic 
setting to exert a subtle influence over the perception of instruments and, 
largely working through these perceptions, to affect choice. 
The influence of the second notion of context is more troublesome since 
it entails some behavioral assumptions about how problems are addres- 
sed and, more generally, about policy formulation. To the extent that 
formulation occurs in a 'garbage can', with instruments in search of 
problems, we can expect the problem context to be mediated by the ex ante 
choice of instrument. At the opposite extreme, viewing formulation as an 
analytical exercise automatically assigns the problem context a definitive 
role in instrument choice. In effect, instruments are designed to meet the 
requirements of problem situations rather than vice versa. 
The empirical question is: do decisionmakers (and perhaps experts) 
tend to choose the same instruments regardless of the problem under 
consideration, or do they pick different instruments to match, at least in 
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their own minds, a given situation? A tendency to favor the same 
instruments across problem contexts would suggest a close link between 
instrument perception and choice, and attribute much of the variation in 
choice to the decisionmaker's attributes and setting. Conversely, if choice 
varies systematically by problem situation, the link between choice and 
instrument perception becomes confounded by perceptions of the situa- 
tion itself. The setting then would exert its influence on choice not through 
how instruments are viewed but by the way problems are structured. 
The third notion of context as a unique constellation of events and 
circumstances that cannot be generalized and yet accounts fully for any 
given choice has contributed much to the richness of the case study 
method. It creates a presumption of uniqueness that justifies attention to 
detail but resists development of contingency statements. Although we 
adopt this notion of context, we restrict its influence to indirect means 
involving the choice setting. From this perspective, it is not the choice of 
instrumentperse that is temporally unique but rather the emergence of the 
organizational setting within which choice takes place. When the deci- 
sionmaker's organization was founded, in other words, should matter 
more in explaining instrument choice than when a given choice was taken. 
Research on Polig Instruments 
The conceptual backing for the propositions posed above is drawn from 
several bodies of literature in the policy sciences. While we can discuss 
these bodies separately, they share a concern with how governments 
attempt to perform their tasks, and a reformist penchant for seeking how 
government might be able to perform those tasks better. 
Policy Design. 
Concern with the instruments used by government to reach its policy 
goals fits within a more general concern for policy design (Linder and 
Peters, 1984; Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987). The basic questions are: how do 
governments choose goals, how do they select means for reaching goals, 
and how do those means conform to evaluative standards appropriate for 
assessing public policy? Formulation is the least analytically-developed 
stage of the conventional policymaking process model (Jones, 1977; 
Peters, I986), at least in terms of the understanding of its dynamics by 
policy experts. We as yet do not have the degree of understanding about 
how governments choose or fashion remedies as we do about how 
governments choose problems to address, or have those problems thrust 
upon them (Kingdon, I984). Thus, an important component of under- 
standing the instruments of government will be understanding where the 
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tools come from (conceptually and practically) and the decisions proces- 
ses involved in selection. 
Here it is important to distinguish between two alternative uses of the 
term policy design in the literature. In one sense, policy design means 
little more than systematic cogitation about policy (Miller, 1984; Ingra- 
ham, 1987). This meaning would hearken back to the old debate between 
incrementalists and synopticists, and would come closer to the synoptic- 
ists than would most policymaking literature in the United States 
(Braybrooke and Lindblom, I963; Simon, 1947). The alternative mean- 
ing of design is the development of a systematic understanding of the 
selection of instruments and evaluative dimensions (Linder and Peters, 
1984). This would include a prior understanding of the processes of 
causation of public problems, and hence some conscious attempt to select 
instruments that address those processes. Hence, in this second meaning 
of the term, not all systematic analysis of policy is design; design is 
reserved for purposive analysis directed toward instrument selection and 
appropriate means of assessment. 
The Classification of Tools and Instruments. 
Most scholars are now well ~aware that government has a number of 
instruments at its disposal, and that these tools embody different mechan- 
isms for achieving a public policy goal. That fundamental awareness 
aside, a number of deficiencies remaining in the classification of the tools 
of government, and numerous weaknesses in the connection of those 
classifications to other aspects of policy analysis. There is perhaps an even 
greater weakness in the manner of relating available policy instruments to 
the decisional process in government itself. Even if experts could agree on 
the nature of policy instruments, a number of questions would remain 
about how those in government would conceptualize their own 
alternatives. 
The first large scale attempt at classifying policy means was Kirschen's 
(I964) analysis of the tools available for economic policy. This is a very 
detailed analysis with 64 types of instruments, relying upon the econo- 
mist's interest in the selection of optimal instruments for intervention, and 
an associated normative analysis of the instruments. This was an exercise 
in the enumeration of available tools and their economic effects rather 
than either an attempt to build a taxonomy of those tools or an analysis of 
the broad range of effects one type of instrument or another might have. It 
does, however, establish a standard for comprehensiveness and further 
provides a useful check-list against which to compare any other enumer- 
ation or taxonomic scheme. 
The classificatory analysis of policy instruments became more 
This content downloaded from 142.58.129.109 on Tue, 9 Apr 2013 03:26:57 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
40 Stephen H. Linder and B. Guy Peters 
apparent to political scientists and policy experts with Mosher's (I980) 
concern with the instruments available to government, and the increasing 
utilization of non-expenditure instruments to reach policy goals. He 
provides a (very) rough catalogue of available instruments, but con- 
centrates attention on the simple dichotomy between expenditure and 
non-expenditure instruments. This style of analysis was pushed forward 
somewhat (Salamon, I98I; Kettl, 1987) and their concern for third-party 
government. They also concentrate attention on the rather simple 
dichotomy between direct and indirect service provision, but go further 
than Mosher to identify differences in the political effects (but with little 
concern with other categories of effects) of those two classifications of 
instruments. 
Subsequent classification efforts have provided more detailed analyses 
of the available instruments. Several classificatory schemes have 
employed only four broad categories to attempt to capture the full range of 
government activity. Hood (1984) used the acronym NATO to describe 
what, in a very broad sense, governments can do: Nodality, Authority, 
Treasure, and Organization. This classificatory scheme implies that 
government can approach its problems by using the information at its 
disposal, its legal powers, its money, or its formal organizational capacity. 
McDonnell and Elmore (I986) also use a four-fold scheme for 'generic 
classes of instruments': Mandates, Inducements, Capacity-building, and 
System-changing. Their approach also provides some limited guidance 
concerning assumptions underlying each class of instruments and the 
expected effect of each. In a more-fully developed classificatory scheme 
Doern and Phidd (1 983) discuss a continuum of instruments for interven- 
ing into the economy, ranging from self-regulation to public ownership. 
The dimension underlying this continuum is the degree of intrusiveness of 
the instruments (see also Phidd and Doern, I978). 
There are a number of problems with each of these schemes or 
taxonomies. First, the simpler schemes, e.g. Hood and McDonnell and 
Elmore, contain extremely broad categories, so broad perhaps that there 
is as much variance within them as between them (Ingram and 
Schneider i988). Further, it is not at all clear that the categories are 
necessarily mutually exclusive, although they are probably collectively 
exhaustive if we are willing to stretch their common-sense meanings. For 
example, since almost all public laws and therefore all public policy 
instruments involve Authority from Hood's scheme, where does the 
authoritative element of a tax program end and the treasure element 
begin? Or, in the McDonnell and Elmore scheme, cannot some induce- 
ments be capacity building? It appears that these schemes do not conform 
to fundamental standards of taxonomy construction (see McKelvey, 
I982). 
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A second problem with these classificatory schemes is that they remain 
just that. There is relatively little attempt at utilization of these schemes as 
mechanisms for policy analysis. This could be done in one of at least two 
ways. The first would be to develop evaluative mechanisms related to the 
instruments, or to the entire range of instruments. What do we expect in a 
'good' policy instrument, and what sort of mixes of criteria does each 
instrument imply? As we will point out, that utility may have to be 
contextualized at some later time, but there would be a place at which to 
start the analysis. To the extent that there are evaluative criteria associ- 
ated with policy instruments they tend to be uni-dimensional (political or 
economic) rather than sufficiently multi-dimensional to reflect the reality 
of policymaking situations. 
Alternatively, instead of evaluating the instruments in the abstract, 
there might be more attempt to evaluate them contextually, and develop 
contingent relationships between policy problems and policy instru- 
ments. This may beg a prior question-where are the usable classifica- 
tions of policy problems?-but it is nonetheless an important direction in 
which to carry a concern about policy instruments. Such an approach 
would, in fact, require the development of an enhanced understanding of 
the nature of policy problems, moving beyond simple nominal categories 
(health, education, etc.) and beyond the simple classifications (e.g. Lowi, 
1972; see also Spitzer, I987) that have been used so often in political 
science. 
Finally, as implied above, we will need to move beyond the abstract 
analytical schemes concerning policy instruments to a more complete 
understanding of the manner in which they are conceptualized by the 
individuals who must make policy decisions, and contextualized to meet 
the demands of particular situations. It may well be that those decision- 
makers do not, in fact, have very complete conceptualizations of policy 
instruments (Kelman, I 98 I). They may make their decisions about what 
policy instruments to employ based on tradition, intuition, ideology or 
merely familiarity. Whatever the empirical 'pictures' which the decision- 
makers carry in their heads about instruments, it is important to under- 
stand something of the dynamics of choice if we are to understand 
policymaking. In this case, as in so many other aspects of policymaking, 
the social constructionist viewpoint may be essential to understanding 
what is really happening with the participants in the process (Steinberger, 
I 980; Berger and Luckmann, I 966). Further, if one purpose of this type of 
research is to improve the quality of the decisions taken in government, it 
will be important to make more complete information about instruments 
available to decisionmakers (Dunn, I982). 
As we attempt to understand policy instruments, it is important not to 
lose sight of the institutional influences on their selection. Not only do the 
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individuals who inhabit government institutions have ideas about the 
appropriate policy instruments, institutions themselves appear to 
embody certain approaches to policy problems. We do not mean to reify 
the institutions, but the collective memory of an organization will tend to 
produce the same results from deliberations over time. Not only does the 
collective memory of an organization tend to be associated with the 
repetitive use of certain instruments, but the very nature of institutions 
may limit their choices. 
An Approach to Building Theory on Instrument Choice and Policy Design 
Four elements are necessary to develop a theory of instrument choice and 
policy design: i) policy instruments, the basic building blocks of public 
policy 2) attributes of these instruments, serving both as criteria of 
appraisal and organizing principles of perception 3) contexts within 
which assessments typically occur, and 4) users and purveyors of instru- 
ments whose behaviors we intend to explain. 
i) The Quest for a Basic Set of Generic Instruments 
There is little agreement in the literature on a basic set of domestic 
policy instruments common to Western liberal democracies, however, nor 
is there anything approaching consensus on a set of general classes of 
instruments that might serve as strata to define sampling frames. Part of 
the problem is a nominalist penchant for novelty and the appearance of 
innovation in policy design. We call something by a different name either 
to avoid associations with past failures or to encourage associations with 
valued symbols. Medicare and Social Security are both insurance mechan- 
isms in the United States authorized under the same organic statute with 
compulsory premiums and age (or condition) based eligibility. And yet 
the former was given the appearance of an in-kind transfer program and 
the latter of a public pension plan. Should these nominal differences be 
subordinated to their functional similarities? Is there one instrument 
here, or two? 
A related difficulty is that few instruments are limited to only a single 
function or to serving only one objective at a time. Consequently, 
identifying the policy instrument actually employed in a given circum- 
stance may be less than straightforward. Agricultural price supports have 
the appearance of an insurance instrument designed to counter the 
variability of crop prices associated with changing weather conditions. 
Yet the primary function would seem to be the transfer of income to 
farmers in lean years. Are these kinds of price supports an insurance 
instrument or a transfer instrument? Should we classify an instrument by 
its explicit functions or its implicit ones? The expressed intentions of the 
framers are unlikely to be of much help in disentangling symbol from 
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substance or explicit functions from the implicit ones. In a pluralist 
system the framers themselves seldom agree. The investigator's purposes 
then may be the only warrant available for defending these choices. 
While the distinction among functions is largely an arbitrary one based 
on the investigator's analytical perspective, the more interesting issue is 
why, in the crop support example, the cash transfer aspect remains 
implicit. Why use price support mechanisms instead of relatively more 
efficient cash grants? To be sure, some functions are more sensitive 
politically than others; accordingly, support for a given instrument may 
depend on those functions remaining implicit or at least indefinite. Tax 
credits may be used to mask the magnitude of government subsidies to 
business, for example, or loan guarantees may be used to subsidize certain 
activities without necessitating any current financial outlays. In short, 
appearances matter, but the discovery of the various implicit functions 
served by a given instrument tells us why they do. 
A third difficulty in arriving at a basic set of instruments for study is 
that both nominal and functional differences can be confused with 
different levels of generality. An apparent difference between instruments 
may stem more from differences in the scale of their operations or in the 
scope of their intended results than from any basic dissimilarity in their 
workings. A testing and inspection requirement may represent a distinc- 
tive instrument when compared with public certification, for example, 
but both serve a basic screening function, with the latter simply being the 
more inclusive of the two. Any given sample is likely to contain several 
instruments that are nominally different but can be logically arranged 
into a hierarchy of increasing inclusiveness. 
The chances of confusing differences in level of generality for basic 
functional differences can easily complicate comparisons across instru- 
ments. Any given pair of instruments may represent the same mechanism, 
but one may be a special case of the other, may encompass a larger variety 
of operations, or may be directed at a broader target. Are these differences 
at all comparable to basic functional ones? Should they be treated 
distinctly from the nominal differences mentioned above? Again, are there 
two distinct instruments represented in such cases or only one? 
Many instruments represent mixed levels of generality undermining 
any uniform strategy for treating comparisons across levels. Instruments 
may be functionally similar but differ in the scale of their operations, in 
the range of special cases they encompass, or in the scope of their targets. 
To the extent that instruments entail different levels of variety, scope of 
operations and scale of objectives, any micro-macro distinctions only 
muddy the waters. Consider, for example, the problem of comparing a 
credit instrument such as open market operations, that while assuming 
only a few distinct forms is targeted at economy-wide indicators, with loan 
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guarantees which come in an array of shapes and sizes but are narrowly 
targeted at eligible households and enterprises. Neither can be said to 
include the other as a special case. Both are likely to affect interest rates 
and bear some functional similarity. Yet, they are seldom viewed as either 
competitors or substitutes. 
The upshot of all this is that compiling a defensible list of basic policy 
instruments is no simple matter. Moreover, a generation of efforts to do so 
based primarily on typologies of policy impacts (Lowi, 1972; Spitzer, 
I 987), governmental roles (Ripley, I 966; Hood, I 984) or policy functions 
(Dahl and Lindblom, 1953; Lynn and Seidl, 1975) has made little 
cumulative progress. Most efforts identify four or so general classes and 
sort illustrative instruments among them; some hypothesize about the 
instruments themselves (Doern and Phidd, I983) and others only about 
the general classes (Hood, I984; Spitzer, I987). While no definitive list of 
policy instruments has emerged from this literature, it does serve as an 
extensive and accessible compilation of strong candidates. 
Once we have a consistent notion of the instrument as a reliable unit, 
we can attempt to enumerate the population of units, and then draw a 
sample of 'representative' instruments that will capture something 
approaching the full range and variety of workable designs for implement- 
ing public policy. The enumeration of the population undertaken here is 
based on a synthesis of published lists of instruments, eliminating 
repetition but preserving their assignment to general classes. While four 
classes came up repeatedly as the preferred number, they were hardly 
ever the same four. We use seven classes to accommodate these dispari- 
ties: i) direct provision 2) subsidy 3) tax 4) contract 5) authority 6) 
regulation (the only consensus class), and 7) exhortation. The idea is to 
avoid biasing our sample of instruments in a way that might not permit us 
to accommodate others' priorities and points of view. Unlike earlier 
efforts at building lists from typologies, our aim is not to preserve a tidy 
classification scheme but rather to be able to capture experts' and 
decisionmakers' logic in use. Accordingly, the accuracy of the link 
between a given instrument and a particular class or type matters less 
than thoroughness in arriving at a representative list. The proper links 
between instruments and instrument classes as well as the identities of the 
classes themselves remain key empirical questions. 
Tentative enumeration of instruments that emerges from this selection 
procedure is intentionally second best with no assurance of either an 
exhaustive or mutually exclusive set of entries. Claims to an exhaustive 
listing can easily be rebutted by pointing to the 'levels of generality' 
problem introduced earlier. Similarly, claims about mutually exclusive 
listings can be shown to be insensitive to the complex interplay between 
an instrument's functions and its (nominal) appearance. Nonetheless, to 
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ensure balance across classes and representativeness within them, our list 
includes three instruments from each of the 7 classes, along with i extra 
instrument from the two largest classes, regulation and subsidy. The list 
of 23 instruments intended to be representative of the various enumer- 
ations found in the literature appears in the Appendix. The list provides a 
useful reference point for eliciting policymakers' judgments. 
2) Design Criteria, and the Attributes of Instruments 
Much of the analytical effort at typologizing the instruments of public 
policy has been motivated by the prospect of building a theory of 
instrument choice as a vantage point for understanding policymaking. 
Presumably, the instruments chosen reveal something about the inten- 
tions and purposes of the choosers, over and above the influences and 
constraints of a particular context. The corollary is that the choice of 
instrument, and more generally the design of policy, has substantial 
consequences for performance. Few would deny that every instrument 
interacts with its context; however, it is the relative importance of the 
interaction for performance that remains an empirical question (compare 
Majone, 1975 with Doern and Phidd, 1983). To the extent that the choice 
of instrument has an independent effect, the criteria underlying that 
choice reveal not only the most important components of instrument 
design but also the dimensions of performance that appear most salient to 
the chooser. 
Those more attentive to the interaction of instrument with context 
advocate a close match or goodness of fit between them rather than any 
particular characteristic of the instrument itself (Mayntz, 198I; Elmore, 
I985). This interactive view of instruments and context bears an interest- 
ing relationship to the attempts of systems experts at prescribing the best 
tool for a given job. For Elmore, in contrast, finding the very best tool is 
secondary to properly defining the job and then sorting out the con- 
tingencies. With the job taken as given, however, the instrument's 
capacity to alter the context in the desired direction-its efficacy- 
becomes its only relevant feature. While appealing in its logic, this 
teleological view is insensitive to the many factors that contribute to the 
soundness of an instrument's design, irrespective of its efficacy in a given 
context. Such views can offer no account, besides human fallibility, for 
instances when the less efficacious or 'wrong' instrument happens to be 
chosen. Attempts to refine this account with the notion of 'feasibility' 
operating as an arbitrary constraint (Meltsner, 1975; May, 198I) work 
once again to shift the focus from the instrument per se to conditions 
prevailing in its context. 
There is a line of reasoning, extending back to Dahl and Lindblom's 
early work (I 953), that focuses on the attributes of instruments as a means 
of highlighting the necessary tradeoffs among them. Such tradeoffs 
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effectively foil any attempt to arrive at a single best instrument. From 
their survey of instruments, Dahl and Lindblom (I 953) conclude that less 
coercive instruments generally appear both harder to control and more 
resource intensive than more coercive ones. Although Ripley (I966) 
substitutes intrusiveness for coerciveness and level of selectivity in impact 
for ease of control, he poses the same basic tradeoffs. Less selective 
instruments tend to be more intrusive, and while cheaper to administer, 
they are more costly in terms of political support. 
Later work narrows the focus but reinforces these conclusions. Con- 
centrating on the tradeoff between administrative costs and political 
support, Salamon (I98I) finds that the same characteristics that make 
instruments easy to manage, also make them prone to political opposi- 
tion. Hood (I984) refines Ripley's notion of selectivity to encompass ease 
of control and accuracy but also finds that while instruments with these 
qualities are typically less intrusive they tend to also be resource- 
intensive. Diver (1983) completes this connection by tying accuracy to 
complexity. Simple instruments economize on the costs of monitoring and 
enforcement but are generally inaccurate and error-prone; that is, they 
may mis-define subjects or misdirect them. These errors in turn create 
unnecessary intrusions. To achieve greater accuracy, one must be willing 
to add to the complexity of an instrument's design and bear the higher 
costs of its administration. 
In sum, three basic relationships frame the central tradeoffs: i) the 
higher the precision of the instrument, the less intrusive it is likely to be 2) 
the less intrusive the instrument, the less likely it is to arouse public 
opposition, but 3) the higher its precision, the more complex and costly 
the instrument is to administer. One's choice of instrument then would 
seem to depend on the relative value one places on each of these four 
general attributes. In fact, several attempts have been made to explain 
patterns of instrument choice by imputing one or more of these values to 
decisionmakers. 
Much of the work on policy and instrument types is organized, either 
implicitly or explicitly, around the theme of coerciveness; this focus is 
grounded in a political tradition that supports a presumption against 
liberty-limiting uses of governmental power. Arranging policy instru- 
ments along a continuum from the least to the most coercive effectively 
forms a natural ordering of steadily increasing burdens of proof and 
persuasion associated with the expansion of government's role in private 
activities. Further, different requirements of proof and persuasion can be 
seen to engage distinctive policy processes. By inference, in choosing an 
instrument somewhere along the continuum, in effect, one is also selecting 
the policy process required to implement that choice (Lowi, 1972; 
Atkinson and Chandler, 1983). 
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Taking this a step further, several investigators (Doern and Wilson, 
I974; Phidd and Doern, 1978) treat the presumption against coercion as 
the central criterion informing decisionmakers' choices among instru- 
ments; that is, other things being equal, the decisionmaker will always 
choose the least coercive untried instrument, moving over time from least 
coercive to most coercive in any given policy area. Our earlier discussion 
of tradeoffs featured several variations on the coerciveness criterion, 
including intrusiveness (Ripley, I966);-it suggested limitations being 
placed more on autonomy than on liberty-and a more inclusive con- 
straint on subject (Hood, I984). Together these attributes tap an underly-, 
ing current of ideological thought that occasionally surfaces in public 
debate over instruments. In the absence of other information, ideological 
principles may provide the only basis for discriminating among complex 
instruments, as Kelman (1 98 I) finds in his case study of fees and quotas as 
instruments of pollution control. 
There are three distinct questions here. First, does coerciveness act as 
the primary criterion in instrument choice? Secondly, does an instru- 
ment's precision appear to mitigate its coerciveness in the same way, as 
some contend, it mitigates intrusiveness? And finally, do basic ideological 
stands, for instance, pro-government or pro-market, serve as generic 
principles for organizing thinking about instruments? The centrality-of- 
coercion hypothesis has been challenged by several investigators who find 
political support, or in the politician's case electoral self-interest, to be a 
more potent motivator of decisionmaker's behavior than any vague 
notion of coerciveness (Trebilcock, et al., I982). This raises the question 
of public visibility and the risks of over- or under-inclusion on the part of a 
given instrument. The more visible instrument would appear to represent 
the greater opportunity (and risk) for seekers of political support. The 
bluntness of the instrument may enhance its visibility but at the same time 
may enlarge its opposition. Moreover, sharpening a given instrument is 
an expensive proposition. While the logic of these assertions has some 
appeal, the empirical question remains: are these tradeoffs a part of the 
real-world process of instrument choice? 
The attributes discussed here can be loosely grouped into four general 
categories: i) resource-intensiveness, including attributes such as 
administrative cost and operational simplicity 2) targeting, taking in 
precision and selectivity 3) political risk, comprised of attributes related 
to support and opposition, such as public visibility, and 4) constraint, 
including coerciveness and ideological principles limiting government 
activity. The first and third categories, resource intensiveness and politi- 
cal risk can be viewed as correlates of political feasibility, as it might apply 
to individual instruments. Resource-intensiveness addresses intra- 
governmental concerns while political risk deals with external ones. The 
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second category, targeting, relates more to technical feasibility and the 
practical assessment of instrument quality. The fourth category, con- 
straint, ties instruments to more fundamental beliefs about what is 
ideologically acceptable, over and above considerations of quality and 
cost. To ensure balance across categories and representativeness within 
them, we draw 2 criteria from each of these four categories. The resulting 
set of 8 design criteria and a tentative set of corresponding dimensions on 
which instruments might vary appear in the Appendix. 
3) The Ecology of Contexts 
One of the principal legacies of Harold Lasswell, as a founding father of 
the policy sciences, is the recognition that the policy context exerts 
considerable influence over both the course of events in policymaking and 
the outcome (Torgerson, I985). To some extent, his championing of 
contextuality can be viewed as an antidote to the practice of policy 
analysis at that time; in effect, the institutional concerns of political 
scientists had finally found a place in the toolkit of practitioners trained in 
economics and operations research. 
Ironically, at about the same time, political science was turning away 
from institutional concerns in the midst of a behavioral revolution. The 
notion of context as institutional framework thus became confounded 
with the systems idea of environment. Systems metaphors stressed 
adaptation and contingency as sources of behavioral variation and 
contributed to an undercurrent of environmental determinism in social 
science theory (March and Olsen, I984). While the era of comparative 
state studies, with their emphasis on environmental explanations of policy 
variation, appears to be over, a milder form of determinism can still be 
found in policy studies that emphasize feasibility as a potent influence on 
both the decisionmaker and expert. For some, the selection of policy 
instruments has become simply an exercise in feasibility testing (Hoppe, 
van de Graaf and van Dijk, I987). 
Finally, the literature on problem structuring offers yet another way of 
understanding context and its influence (see Dunn, I982). Here the 
emphasis is on neither the institutional framework nor the policy environ- 
ment, but rather on the context of meaning which shapes how policy 
problems are defined. Once the issue of definition is resolved, the choice of 
policy instruments becomes a relatively straightforward matter of match- 
ing tool to task. To say that the context determines the selection and 
performance of instruments, from this perspective is to claim that instru- 
ment and problem share the same context of meaning, or, in other words, 
their connection rests in the eye of the beholder. This is consistent with the 
popular garbage can model of decisionmaking which admits that solu- 
tions (and their advocates) often go in search of problems rather than vice 
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versa, as the more rationalist models would have us believe (Cohen, 
March and Olsen, 1972) . 
Although some contextual factors associated with instrument percep- 
tion and choice may be universal in their influence, we expect substantial 
variation in instrument processes across different combinations of 
organizational, institutional, and systemic characteristics, over and 
above the variation introduced by the decisionmaker's own attributes. An 
extensive catalog of these factors and their empirical combinations could 
be developed, but we will discuss only a sampling of the more salient ones. 
It should be noted that the relationships we posit are tentative and are 
intended as hypotheses. Further, our approach to these relationships de- 
emphasizes the tracing of processes that might link macro characteristics 
with micro ones in favor of a contingency perspective that searches out 
patterns of common variation. The set of these characteristics selected as 
hypothesized contributors to variation in instrument choice appears in 
Table i. 
The Systemic Context. 
The study of comparative public policy has tended to focus more on the 
extent to which individual nations have become involved in various policy 
domains, rather than on their selection of instruments. In part this is a 
legacy of the premise due to Lowi (1972) that policy domain effectively 
delimits the choice process. There is some indirect evidence to suggest 
that national policy styles (Richardson, 1982) are likely to influence the 
perception and choice of policy instruments across such domains. The 
instruments that appear natural in one nation to address its policy 
problems may not appear natural in another. While it remains an 
empirical question as to whether these variations in policy style reflect 
traditions and institutional habits or a more self-conscious analytical 
process, we expect national styles to be responsible for a fair amount of 
variation in instrument choice. 
Although the precise meaning of political culture is open to different 
interpretations, our use of the term is intended to capture the values of a 
statist tradition in different countries, and hence the acceptability of 
centralized governmental intervention into the economy and society. We 
hypothesize that, other things being equal, countries with a more statist 
tradition, such as in Germany and Scandinavian nations, will accept 
more intrusive policy instruments more readily than in less statist 
countries. Relatedly, we would expect the relative coerciveness of instru- 
ments to matter less as a criterion for instrument choice in those countries 
that have a strong statist tradition. If supported, this conjecture would 
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TABLE I: A Tentative List of Causes of Variation in Choice of Policy Instruments 
EXOGENOUS FACTORS ENDOGENOUS 
CONTEXT CONTEXT FACTORS 
AS AS 
SETTING PROBLEM 
Systemic Organizational Problem-Specific Individual 
Variables Variables Variables Variables 
(Macro) (Meso) (Meso) (Micro) 
National Policy Organizational Policy Domain Background 
Style Culture - crowding 
- pattern of - scale Roles 
Political Culture recruitment - professional 
(Statism) - period of Requirements - institutional 
establishment - symbolic 
Social Cleavages - pattern of - functional Cognitive Factors 
socialization - support - perceptions 
- ideology 
External Contacts Constraints - values and 
- policy communities - existing criteria 
- clientele commitments 
- resource 
limitations 
limit the scope of the centrality of coercion hypothesis associated with the 
work of the Canadian scholars Doern and Phidd (I 983). 
To the extent that social cleavages based in language, religion, region, 
and so on, are present in a country and have substantial political salience, 
governments may prefer less visible policy instruments. For example, 
varieties of tax and regulatory instruments would be preferred over direct 
expenditures or governmental provision of services. Presumably, the 
gains and losses conferred on different social groups by regulatory 
controls or tax breaks are less readily calculable than those associated 
with expenditure and service programs, and hence are less likely to raise 
objections based on inequity among competing groups. Similarly, govern- 
ance in divided societies may require more coercive instruments, while in 
well-integrated, more homogeneous societies, instruments such as public 
promotion and information may be sufficient for the same purposes. 
The Organizational Context. 
In addition to the contribution of national characteristics to defining the 
context for perception and choice, the characteristics of particular 
organizations within the public sector also play a role. Organizations 
have cultures and value systems just as do nations, and they also have 
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both a mission and an institutional memory shaping the course of their 
intervention in a particular policy domain. This institutional context 
creates what amounts to a predisposition toward some instruments and 
against others. 
Consider the contribution of the time period in which the organization 
was formed to the development and persistence of a unique set of values 
and symbols that might be reflected in instrument choice. Organizations 
formed during periods of expansion in the public sector, e.g. the New Deal 
or the Great Society in the United States, may be more inclined toward 
expenditure-based instruments, say, cash grants or the direct provision of 
services by the government, in part because of the ethos of confidence in 
government and an ambitious sense of purpose. On the other hand, 
organizations formed during periods of fiscal restraint may tend toward 
more cautious measures of smaller scale and lower expectations, favoring 
cheaper regulatory instruments, for example, over more intensive spend- 
ing programs. Once set at the time of establishment, these elements of 
organizational culture may be difficult (although certainly not imposs- 
ible) to change and may have a lasting influence over instrument 
perception and choice. 
Another organizational factor affecting the selection of instruments is 
the nature of external contacts. These contacts will be of at least two 
different types. One is the nature of the clientele served by the organiza- 
tion. Some of these relationships may be very obvious; organizations 
serving disadvantaged populations will tend to rely on cash grants or in- 
kind transfers more than will other organizations. Other relationships 
may be somewhat more subtle. So, for example, organizations serving 
multiple clientele groups, or which have multiple purposes, may rely 
(much as we argued above for the national level) more on regulatory 
instruments to be able to serve all factions in a relatively evenhanded way. 
The second aspect of the external environment of the organization is the 
policy community within which it functions. The developing literature on 
policy communities (Campbell, I 989; Walker, I 989) points to the import- 
ance of the contacts of public organizations and programs with research 
organizations, multiple interest groups, other governmental organiza- 
tions, etc. in shaping policy. While this is usually discussed more in terms 
of choosing to intervene in a policy area and the content of policy, the 
policy community may be of equal relevance in the selection of the 
instruments of policy. This is especially true given that think tanks in 
particular tend to become associated with particular policy instruments 
and may advocate those as solutions to a variety of policy problems. If 
such a think tank is included as a significant component of policy 
community of the public sector organization, then that organization will 
be under some pressure to adopt that particular instrument. 
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Context As Problem Situation. 
First, individuals may respond to a given context with judgments of 
effectiveness that remain fairly constant across particular instruments. 
For the most part, the attributes of any given instrument are thought to 
matter less than the prevailing conditions, including feasibility, political 
support, and so on. Second, how an individual assesses an instrument 
may be largely independent of the context within which it is applied. This 
is the contra-Lasswellian view that remains a part of the policy sciences. 
In this instance, contextual factors would seem to play a much smaller 
role than do the characteristics of the instruments themselves. Third, 
some contexts may induce certain tool assessments consistently in 
individuals, regardless of other differences in their training or points of 
view. This convergence of tools and contexts is consistent with what 
happens in the garbage can model, with opportunity rather than particu- 
lar individuals prompting the convergence. Do assessments of instrument 
effectiveness appear to be consistent across contexts? Do certain individu- 
als favor certain tools regardless of the particular job to be done? 
4) Types of Users 
The point made above concerning the need to understand decision- 
makers' conceptualizations of the available instruments should be 
extended to make a clear distinction between the producers and con- 
sumers of knowledge about policy instruments (Dunn, I986; Dunn and 
Holzner, I 988). Academics have been the producers of the analysis about 
instruments, but there is little evidence that this analysis has actually 
penetrated to the target consumers of that knowledge-those in govern- 
ment who must actually make decisions. For example, Kelman (I98I) 
found that few of those making decisions about environmental policy 
instruments could provide any detailed justifications for their preferences 
for certain instruments. They tended to respond in terms of some vague 
ideological predispositions, and their familiarity with instruments cur- 
rently being used. 
While cognitive factors are important in design decisions, we expect 
other characteristics of individuals to interact with them. Consider, for 
example, the fundamental differences between the theorists and pro- 
ducers of designs outside government and the consumers and promoters 
of these design ideas within government. Although we expect systematic 
differences in perception and evaluation to emerge within these two 
groups, based on background and training, we anticipate a more dra- 
matic set of differences, based on role and status, to emerge between these 
two groups. Such differences would be consistent with the two-worlds 
metaphor grounded in the knowledge utilization literature. The alterna- 
tive hypothesis, however, is that networks will tend to form around 
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particular instruments, based on shared perceptions and beliefs that 
overwhelm any role differences, and perhaps background ones as well. 
The individuals who comprise an organization are likely to influence 
the types of instruments that the organization favors. A number of 
characteristics of individuals may be associated with preferences toward 
certain instruments. For example, just as organizations may be influenced 
by the period in which they were formed, so too may individuals be 
influenced by the time period in which they are socialized politically, and 
in which they were recruited to the organization. Organizations have age 
lumps (Downs, I967) of employees whose values may affect instrument 
selection. Perhaps more important than age or general socialization is the 
professional socialization received by members of an organization. Every- 
thing else being equal, we would expect individuals trained as lawyers, for 
example, to first think of using legal instruments (administered contracts, 
procedural guidelines, etc.) with which they are most familiar rather than 
other types of instruments (Gormley, I986). Likewise, economists tend to 
think first of tax and expenditure instruments, or other incentive- 
dependent instruments such as franchises. This tendency may be rein- 
forced by organizational memberships, as some organizations come to be 
dominated by one profession or another. 
Similarly, it may also be reinforced by the characteristics of national 
administrative systems. For example, the pattern of recruiting lawyers 
into the civil service in various Northern European countries might tend 
to generate a greater reliance on legally-oriented instruments than might 
otherwise be expected. To the extent that any analysis of instruments has 
penetrated into government, it appears to have done so in the form of 
economists and/or lawyers who bring with them the biases of their 
respective professions toward certain types of instruments, and toward 
different standards of assessment (Gormley, I 986). 
An Alternative Path to a Theory of Design 
The above discussion advocates an alternative way for developing and 
ultimately testing theory about the design of policy instruments. It stands 
in stark contrast, however, to the path most often advocated in the 
literature on instruments and policy design. In the simplest of terms, the 
received view is that theory development can best proceed inductively by 
generating contingency statements from case materials that illustrate the 
application of different instruments to policy problems (see Greenberg, et 
al., 1977). The evidence on instrument performance rests on the investi- 
gator's case-by-case judgments about the goodness of fit or match of 
instrument to problem. Presumably, the mismatched or poorly fitting 
instrument is one that performs well below the investigator's expectations 
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for a given problem. Prescriptions are thought to follow directly from the 
resulting inventory of satisfactory instrument-problem matches. Accord- 
ingly, as new policy problems arise they should be matched to those 
instruments judged to have performed adequately on roughly similar 
problems. Generalizations from observed patterns of instrument-problem 
matches not only sustain these prescriptions but also serve as the basis for 
any theoretical propositions about the design of policy. 
A decade ago this case inventory approach to solution development 
drew considerable interest. Its appeal seemed to rest on two, widely-held 
ontological premises: first, that context was the overriding influence on 
performance, in effect, making each policy problem unique; and second, 
that the key to enhancing performance, following the logic of the con- 
tingency theories then dominating the field of organization studies, was to 
mold interventions to fit this context. Despite its early promise, however, 
this approach in practice has advanced neither the formulation of 
solutions nor the progress of theory. As applied to the study of implemen- 
tation, for example, it has yielded contradictory propositions and low- 
grade prescriptions that seem to hold little attraction for policy makers 
(O'Toole, 1987). More importantly, the ontological assumptions behind 
this approach appear less tenable than they once were, in part, because of 
the demise of situational determinism in the behavioral siciences and the 
recognition that contingency theory has not fulfilled its promise for 
organizational design. 
Once the ontological commitments to context and fit are put aside, the 
inventory of cases approach loses much of its rationale. The evaluative 
burden this approach places on the investigator, especially when added to 
the tedium of case collection and coding, is simply too great to compensate 
for the limited rewards associated with idiosyncratic detail. This 
approach holds the investigator responsible for classifying both problems 
and instruments, somehow without sacrificing contextual richness. Fur- 
ther, the investigator must determine whether the application of instru- 
ment to problem in a given case represents a match or mismatch, 
corresponding in some well-defined way to policy success or failure. In 
effect, the policymaker who implicitly performs these calculations in each 
instance is relegated to the sidelines. Not only is agency ceded to the flow 
of events that define each case-in-context but all reconstructive judgment 
is left to the investigator. If it is not the policymaker's own judgment on 
these matters that informs the inquiry, what reason does he or she have for 
attending to the results? 
The alternative approach to theory construction advocated above is 
more phenomenological, since it places the policymaker at the center of 
the valuative judgments that frame the inquiry. It is the policymaker's 
criteria-not the investigator's-that structure judgments about instru- 
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ments and serve as the basis for any working taxonomy. It is the 
policymaker's judgments-not the investigator's-that determine 
whether a given instrument has succeeded or failed. Finally, it is the 
policymaker's biases-not the investigator's-that shape the relative 
influence of context and of the perceived attributes of instruments on 
design choices. In putting aside the premises that suppress the autonomy 
of the policymaker, we are better able to understand the judgments that 
are being made, and the mental pictures that policymakers have of the 
instruments they choose to employ. Understanding the subjective side of 
those instruments should also clarify the various meanings assigned to 
them, their status, and the logic (or illogic) behind their selection. In 
contrast to the case inventory approach, we are principally concerned 
with the policymaker's own criteria and subjective premises rather than 
with any objective characteristics that an outside investigator might wish 
to impute to particular instruments. 
Consistent with this argument, the best way to build typologies of 
policy instruments is to ground them in policymakers' own views of what 
makes instruments operationally and symbolically comparable or 
unique. As with the case inventory approach, the construction of analyti- 
cal typologies that are purely a product of the investigator's induction 
seemed to hold early promise as a path to theory development. While 
typologies have proliferated in the last two decades and serve as a source 
for our tentative enumeration of instruments, they have yet to produce a 
definitive middle-range theory of policy instruments worthy of empirical 
verification. From our perspective, progress has been slowed by the 
discontinuity between the perspectives of the policymaker and those of the 
investigator or, more generally, by the gap between the logic-in-use of the 
former and the reconstructive logic of the latter. 
The typologies that policymakers use to organize their thinking about 
instruments may not have much of a theoretical basis or elaborate 
dimensionality, but then again may not be as simplistic as some we have 
discussed. The point is that-much like the workings of context-the 
form and content of the typologies most relevant to policy design are, in 
large part, empirical questions not easily dismissed by assumption or 
resolved by analytical fiat. The typologies underlying design choices may 
exist in the form of simple dichotomies-for example, market versus non- 
market instruments or, on a more elementary level, those perceived as 
available for use versus those that are not. Whatever their form, it is 
important for the progress of theory to understand typologies as con- 
ceptual devices that frame the point of view of the policymaker. 
Despite the limited contribution that analytical typologies have made 
to the development of theory about instruments and design, they have 
played a key role in redefining the study of instruments as a comparative 
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enterprise. The alternative emphasis on in-depth study of a single 
instrument in a unique context may satisfy the requirements of program 
evaluation or impact assessment but yield only weak inferences about 
policy design and its constituent processes. To be able to conclude that a 
particular instrument has been poorly designed in a given instance can be 
valuable as a prelude to further inquiry into other substitutes. By itself, 
however, such a conclusion reveals little of the antecedent considerations 
that led up to the choice of instrument in the first place. We have 
suggested an approach to mapping the subjective elements in instrument 
choice and use that should provide a useful starting point for a compara- 
tive analysis of policy design. Our chosen path to theory development will 
join these subjective factors to an ecology of contexts likely to account for 
variation in instrument choice. 
APPENDIX: A Tentative Enumeration of Representative Policy Instruments and 
Design Criteria 
THE SAMPLE OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
cash grant gov't-sponsored enterprise in-kind transfer 
loan guarantee 'tax break' fee/charge 
certification/screening gov't provision fine 
administered contract quota prohibition 
quality standard jawboning' public promotion 
information/demonstration procedural 'guideline' insurance 
loan license/permit price control 
public investment franchise 
THE SAMPLE OF DESIGN CRITERIA 
ATTRIBUTES OF INSTRUMENTS RANGE OF VARIATION 
Complexity of Operation Low ... High 
Level of Public Visibility Low ... High 
Adaptability Across Uses Low ... High 
Level of Intrusiveness Low ... High 
Relative Costliness Low ... High 
Reliance on Market Mostly ... Mostly 
Market Government 
Chances of Failure Small . .. Large 
Precision of Targeting Low ... High 
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